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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of repatriation taxes on the investment decisions made by foreign 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs). Using a global sample of MNCs, we provide 
evidence that a foreign subsidiary’s investments are less aligned with local growth opportunities 
when its parent faces repatriation taxes on its earnings. This negative effect of repatriation taxes 
on investment efficiency is weaker when the parent monitors the subsidiary more closely and when 
the parent has a stronger need for the subsidiary’s earnings to be repatriated. We interpret these 
results as evidence that agency conflicts between a parent’s central management and the foreign 
subsidiary’s management drive the observed inefficiency. We confirm our results and establish a 
causal relationship using natural experiments in the U.K. and Japan, which both eliminated 
repatriation taxes from their international tax systems in 2009. Our results suggest that repatriation 
taxes reinforce agency conflicts within MNCs, leading to economically less efficient investment 
decisions at the subsidiary level. 
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1. Introduction 
Repatriation of dividends from a foreign subsidiary often triggers taxes levied by the 
subsidiary country (e.g., withholding tax), the parent country (e.g., corporate income tax), or both. 
Prior research on the effects of such repatriation taxes has examined the investment decisions made 
by the central management of a multinational corporation (MNC). Hanlon, Lester, & Verdi (2015) 
and Edwards, Kravet, & Wilson (2016), for instance, show that the central management of U.S. 
MNCs use “trapped” foreign cash to engage in value-destroying merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity. Both papers suggest, but do not empirically show, that this is evidence of agency conflicts 
between shareholders and the parent’s central management. In contrast to these studies, we 
examine  non-M&A investment decisions made by the manager of the foreign subsidiary, who has 
different incentives and monitoring than the CEO of the parent (Antràs, Desai, & Foley, 2009; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Harford, 1999) and ask the following empirical questions: do 
repatriation taxes decrease the efficiency of subsidiary-level investment and do agency conflicts 
between central and foreign subsidiary management drive this effect?  
We explore the efficiency rather than the profitability of investment because we are 
interested in whether the foreign subsidiary manager’s investment decisions maximize 
shareholder value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Investment efficiency refers to the alignment of the 
subsidiary manager’s investment decisions with local growth opportunities, while profitability 
captures broad results of investments that may not be directly affected by the manager’s decisions. 
The subsidiary manager’s investment decisions in the current period should, in the absence of 
frictions or agency conflicts, be in line with local growth opportunities (Tobin, 1969). However, 
as frictions in the MNC’s internal capital market arise, the investment decisions of the subsidiary 
manager may be distorted and become less aligned with local growth opportunities. Taxes levied 
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on the repatriation of foreign income represent such a friction in the internal capital market of an 
MNC (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007; Beyer, Downes, & Rapley, 2017; Laplante & 
Nesbitt, 2017). As this tax friction increases the foreign subsidiary’s free cash flows, the 
subsidiary’s manager has the opportunity to reap personal benefits by investing in projects that 
create personal benefits while being of low value to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). 
As such, we hypothesize that repatriation taxes represent a specific source of agency conflicts 
between the parent’s central management and the foreign subsidiary’s management that could lead 
to inefficient subsidiary-level investment.  
We use unconsolidated financial statement data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database for 
the years 2007 to 2014 to construct a sample of foreign subsidiaries based in 37 countries, whose 
parents are located in 56 countries. The foreign subsidiaries are owned by MNCs domiciled in 
countries that levy repatriation taxes for all or part of our sample period (e.g., U.S., U.K., Japan, 
India, and South Korea) and in countries that do not levy repatriation taxes throughout (e.g., 
Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy). Using this global sample, we are able to compare the 
investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes to a counterfactual in the 
same foreign country-industry-year not subject to these taxes (see Figure 1). Because of substantial 
variation in repatriation taxes, our cross-country setting provides powerful identification of the 
effect of these taxes on subsidiary-level investment efficiency. 
In our empirical tests, we first confirm that repatriation taxes lead to higher foreign cash 
holdings in our sample, consistent with prior research (Foley et al., 2007). We then test whether 
repatriation taxes impair the efficiency of investment by regressing subsidiary-level investment in 
fixed assets (i.e., capital expenditures) on local growth opportunities (Shroff, Verdi, & Yu, 2014) 
and testing for a different effect for those subsidiaries facing repatriation taxes. We find consistent 
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empirical evidence across multiple specifications and robustness tests that the investment behavior 
of foreign subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes is less aligned with local growth opportunities. 
That is, repatriation taxes lead to lower subsidiary-level investment efficiency.  
Next, we test whether agency conflicts between the parent’s central management and the 
foreign subsidiary’s management drive this effect. We predict that stronger monitoring by the 
parent will reduce agency conflicts and thus the negative effect of repatriation taxes on investment 
efficiency. To test this, we follow prior literature and examine several settings in which the degree 
of monitoring of a foreign subsidiary by central management varies. First, we examine 
membership in a common industry because parents that operate in the same industry as their 
foreign subsidiaries have lower oversight costs and engage in stronger monitoring (e.g., Grinblatt 
& Keloharju, 2001). Second, we compare wholly-owned subsidiaries to partially-owned 
subsidiaries because the free-riding by minority shareholders on the monitoring effort of the 
majority shareholder (i.e., the parent) has been shown to impair the parent’s monitoring incentives 
(Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). Third, we analyze differences in the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the subsidiary country. High quality corporate governance mechanisms reduce 
oversight costs for the parent and thus lead to stronger monitoring. Across all tests, we find that 
the relation between investment efficiency and repatriation taxes does not hold for better-
monitored subsidiaries. These tests provide direct evidence that agency conflicts within an MNC 
drive the negative effect of repatriation taxes on subsidiary-level investment efficiency.  
We next test whether the effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency varies across 
different types of MNCs. Specifically, we predict that the negative effect of repatriation taxes on 
investment efficiency will be weaker when the parent’s need for repatriating the earnings of the 
foreign subsidiary is increased. To test this, we split our sample based on the parent’s financial 
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constraints (Dyreng & Markle, 2016). Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the negative 
effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency is reduced when the potential benefit of 
deferring the repatriation of foreign income is low, i.e. when the parent is financially constrained. 
This result also suggests that financial constraints and a higher likelihood of repatriating foreign 
income mitigate agency conflicts associated with repatriation taxes.  
Finally, we provide evidence that the effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency is 
likely causal by exploiting two natural experiments provided by international tax reforms in the 
U.K. and Japan. Both countries repealed repatriation taxes on foreign earnings in 2009, providing 
an exogenous shock to repatriation taxes that allows us to conduct a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) analysis (Arena & Kutner, 2015). We benchmark the investment behavior of foreign 
subsidiaries of British and Japanese MNCs against that of foreign subsidiaries owned by U.S. 
MNCs and operating in the same foreign country-industry-year. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
MNCs are an appropriate control group for this analysis because they face repatriation taxes 
throughout our entire sample period. Corroborating our baseline results, these tests show that, 
while the level of investment in the subsidiary country decreased following the reform, the 
investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries owned by British and Japanese MNCs increased.  
Our paper makes multiple contributions to the literature. First, we advance research on the 
economic consequences of repatriation taxes (Foley et al., 2007; Nessa, 2016; Blouin, Krull, & 
Robinson, 2017; Gu, 2017). While prior research has studied the M&A decisions of central 
management (Hanlon et al., 2015; Edwards et al., 2016), ours is the first to explicitly link 
repatriation taxes to the efficiency of investments made by the manager of the foreign subsidiary. 
Moreover, by comparing the effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency of subsidiaries 
with the same local growth opportunities but different monitoring, we show that agency conflicts 
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between central management and subsidiary management are an economic channel through which 
repatriation taxes negatively affect subsidiary-level investment decisions. As such, we provide 
evidence for a direct subsidiary-level channel through which repatriation taxes cause efficiency 
losses.1 
Second, we add to the literature on internal capital markets (Williamson, 1975; Shin & 
Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000; Beyer et al., 2017) and offer a tax-based 
explanation for observed heterogeneity in the investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries. Prior 
research has examined how MNCs mitigate agency conflicts between the parent and its foreign 
subsidiaries by, for instance, strategically assigning decision rights (Antràs et al., 2009) or drawing 
on external information to monitor the manager of a foreign subsidiary (Shroff et al., 2014). Our 
results indicate that repatriation taxes aggravate agency conflicts within an MNC and result in 
investment behavior of foreign subsidiaries that is less aligned with local growth opportunities 
(i.e., less efficient). This finding underlines the importance of effective monitoring of a foreign 
subsidiary that holds excess cash.   
Finally, our findings provide needed empirical evidence to inform expectations about the 
effects of changes to the U.S. international tax system. The recently enacted U.S. tax law eliminates 
repatriation taxes on future foreign earnings. Our results indicate that this change will improve the 
efficiency of investment decisions made by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs by removing a 
source of agency costs borne under the previous system. Thus, U.S. MNCs, and potentially their 
shareholders, should benefit from the efficiency gains. The findings for the U.K. and Japan tax 
                                               
1 Edwards, Kravet, & Wilson (2016) suggest that, under certain circumstances, lower-return acquisitions made with 
tax-induced excess cash might be economically optimal for the MNC as a whole because investing the pre-
repatriation-tax earnings abroad leads to a higher return than investing the after-repatriation-tax earnings domestically. 
In other words, MNCs that face repatriation taxes have a limited set of investment opportunities. 
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reforms, in contrast, suggest that the subsidiary country may be negatively affected due to lower 
subsidiary-level investment when U.S. (or other foreign) repatriation taxes are reduced. 
Consequently, our findings should be of interest to policymakers, both in the U.S. and abroad.2  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives on overview of related 
research. Based on this, we develop our hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss our 
sample and empirical design. We present our results and additional tests in Section 5. In Section 6 
we extend our empirical tests to the 2009 tax reforms in the U.K. and Japan to strengthen the causal 
interpretation of our results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background and Prior Research 
2.1 Economic Effects of Repatriation Taxes 
The parent country of an MNC has the right to levy domestic tax on the earnings of foreign 
subsidiaries. Given that those earnings are first subject to subsidiary country tax, the parent country 
chooses from a menu of mechanisms to avoid or reduce the double-taxation of the foreign earnings. 
These mechanisms fall on a spectrum between full exemption (i.e., the parent country exempts the 
foreign earnings from domestic tax) to full double-taxation (i.e., the parent country immediately 
levies domestic tax on the foreign earnings and allows no credit for the foreign taxes paid). All 
countries set international tax laws that fall somewhere on this spectrum. Those that are closer to 
                                               
2 On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Job Act (TCJA) into law. Provisions in the new 
law reduce repatriation taxes on existing earnings held abroad, and eliminate U.S. tax on future foreign earnings of 
U.S. MNCs. Our empirical results, however, remain relevant to policymakers, both as a basis for prediction of the 
effects of the law change, and because repatriation taxes will remain a salient and important fiscal tool for tax 
authorities under all international tax regimes. This is so for two reasons. First, withholding taxes on cross-border 
payments of dividends, interest, and royalties share the same character as repatriation (income) taxes in that they can 
be deferred. Second, repatriation taxes are a common tool used in the base erosion prevention measures implemented 
by countries, so portions of foreign income are likely to remain subject to repatriation taxes.  
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the full exemption end of the spectrum are usually grouped in a “territorial” category, and those 
nearer the other end are grouped in a “worldwide” category.3 In reality, exceptions and provisions 
in the international tax regimes of all major countries result in them falling at different points all 
along the spectrum. For example, and highly relevant to our study, the U.S., until 2018, used a 
worldwide system, but allowed the U.S. tax liability on the foreign earnings (net of credit granted 
for foreign taxes paid) to be deferred until the underlying foreign income was repatriated to the 
U.S. parent as a dividend. Because the domestic (U.S.) tax on the foreign income is triggered by 
the repatriation of the income, we refer to it as a “repatriation tax”. 
At the other end of the spectrum, when the parent country has a territorial system and fully 
exempts the foreign income from domestic tax, repatriation of the foreign income does not trigger 
any parent country tax, and the repatriation tax is zero. If the parent country only partially exempts 
the foreign income (i.e., taxes a portion of it) and allows deferral of the domestic tax liability until 
repatriation, the repatriation tax would be positive.4 
The economic effects of repatriation taxes have been examined in the literature for several 
decades. Hartman (1985) shows theoretically that the level of repatriation tax does not affect an 
MNC's decision to repatriate foreign income when the tax rate is constant over time and all foreign 
income will eventually be repatriated. However, numerous studies have found that repatriation 
taxes do affect repatriations because expected repatriation taxes vary over time (e.g., due to tax 
                                               
3 Territorial systems are also referred to as “exemption” or “source-based” systems. Worldwide systems are also 
referred to as “credit” or “residence-based” systems.  We use the terms territorial and worldwide throughout this paper. 
4 For example, several countries (e.g., Italy and Germany) exempt 95% of foreign dividends (i.e., tax 5%). In addition, 
several countries impose repatriation taxes when certain conditions are present. France, for instance, taxes 100% of 
foreign dividends when they are paid by a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) located in a country with an effective 
tax rate that is 50% lower than the current French corporate income tax rate of 33.33%. In this case, France grants a 
credit for foreign taxes paid, which essentially results in a worldwide tax system. For our main empirical tests, we 
follow prior research (e.g., Markle (2016)) and treat the worldwide/territorial distinction as binary by classifying a 
country as territorial if it exempts 95% or more of foreign dividends.  
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holidays or tax reform; see Altshuler, Newlon, & Randolph, 1994; De Waegenaere & Sansing, 
2008), and because a parent may be able to use foreign earnings for domestic purposes without 
triggering repatriation taxes (e.g., by domestically borrowing against passive assets held by a 
foreign subsidiary; see Altshuler et al., 1994). In addition, Desai, Foley, & Hines (2001) and Desai, 
Foley, & Hines (2007) find a negative relation between repatriation taxes and payouts of U.S. 
foreign subsidiaries, consistent with repatriation taxes having an effect on the decision to 
repatriate.  
Several studies suggest that repatriation taxes provide an incentive for MNCs to defer 
repatriation and to hold cash in their foreign subsidiaries. Foley et al., (2007), for instance, 
document that repatriation taxes drive foreign cash holdings of U.S. MNCs. Due to an increase in 
the expected tax benefit of deferring repatriation, this effect became stronger when Congress 
started deliberating another repatriation-tax holiday in 2008 (De Simone, Piotroski, & Tomy, 
2017). Laplante & Nesbitt (2017) examine different motives to hold cash abroad and find that 
repatriation taxes – among other reasons (e.g., precautionary motives) – significantly contribute to 
foreign cash holdings. These tax costs account for 42 percent of the cash differential between U.S. 
MNCs and purely domestic firms (Gu, 2017). 
Holding cash abroad, however, creates internal capital market frictions (Beyer et al., 2017) 
that distort the allocation of funds within MNCs (De Simone & Lester, 2017). Campbell, Dhaliwal, 
Krull, & Schwab (2014) show that investors place a valuation discount on foreign cash holdings. 
This discount is larger for cash held in tax havens and smaller for MNCs with sophisticated 
investors. In examining the sources of the valuation discount, Harford et al., (2017) document that 
a combination of repatriation taxes, internal financing frictions, and agency costs contribute to the 
lower value of foreign cash holdings. This result is consistent with Yang (2014), who reports a 
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lower marginal value for foreign compared to domestic cash. 
While these papers suggest that foreign cash is of lower value to investors than domestic 
cash, they do not link this difference to specific economic decisions made at the foreign subsidiary 
level. Several studies, however, suggest that repatriation taxes might adversely affect total payouts, 
external financing, or investment at the firm level. Nessa (2016), for example, reports a negative 
effect of repatriation taxes on payouts which is concentrated among MNCs that are unable to 
distribute dividends without incurring repatriation taxes. Similarly, Arena & Kutner (2015) study 
the repeal of repatriation taxes in the U.K. and Japan in 2009 and find that foreign cash holdings 
decreased while MNCs initiated larger total payouts to shareholders after the reform. Ma, Stice, & 
Wang (2017) examine consequences for external financing and find that repatriation taxes are 
associated with higher loan spreads. 
Turning next to investment choices, several studies examine how repatriation taxes affect 
the acquisition choices made at the parent level. Building on a model by Klassen, Laplante, & 
Carnaghan (2014), Edwards et al., (2016) find that repatriation taxes reduce the investment 
opportunity set of MNCs, which leads to less profitable foreign acquisitions. Similarly, and most 
closely related to our study, Hanlon et al., (2015) document that repatriation taxes lead to a higher 
likelihood of acquiring foreign rather than domestic targets. Shareholders, however, react 
negatively to the announcement of acquisitions abroad. Harford et al., (2017) report that MNCs 
with high repatriation tax costs exhibit negative capital-market reactions to the announcement of 
foreign capital expenditure and acquisition plans. Both Hanlon et al., (2015) and Harford et al., 
(2017) speculate that agency conflicts associated with foreign cash holdings may be driving the 
negative investor responses (Jensen, 1986), but neither study provides direct empirical support for 
10 
 
this assertion.5 While these papers examine foreign acquisitions, Blouin et al. (2017) study the 
effects of repatriation taxes on domestic investment. Their results suggest that repatriation taxes 
reduce the sensitivity of domestic investment to domestic growth opportunities.  
Collectively, these studies suggest that repatriation taxes, through the incentive to hold cash 
abroad, result in internal capital market frictions and negatively affect economic decisions. We 
contribute to this stream of research by providing direct evidence that repatriation taxes cause the 
investment behavior of foreign subsidiaries to be less aligned with their growth opportunities. In 
this regard, our paper is the first to explicitly link repatriation taxes to the investment efficiency of 
foreign subsidiaries and to show that agency costs drive this effect. 
2.2 Agency Conflicts and Investment Efficiency 
In the absence of agency conflicts, firm-level investment is a function of the ratio between 
the market value of assets and their replacement costs (Tobin, 1969) and managers invest until the 
marginal benefit of investment equals the marginal cost (Yoshikawa, 1980; Hayashi, 1982; Abel, 
1983). Thus, managers invest exclusively in positive net present value (NPV) projects while 
returning excess cash to their capital providers. Such an investment behavior maximizes 
shareholder value and is therefore regarded as efficient. 
Prior research, however, documents that a divergence in principal-agent incentives, for 
instance between shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976),  can lead to agency 
                                               
5 A related stream of research examines the effect of repatriation taxes on mergers and acquisitions. Feld, Ruf, 
Scheuering, Schreiber, & Voget (2016) find that the repeal of repatriation taxes in Japan and the United Kingdom led 
to an increase in outbound acquisitions of firms located in either of these countries. Similarly, Bird, Edwards, & 
Shevlin (2017) document that U.S. targets with sizable cash holdings are more likely to be acquired by foreign MNCs 
not subject to repatriation taxes. Thus, repatriation taxes also affect the volume and direction of mergers and 
acquisitions and thus shape group structures of MNCs (Huizinga & Voget, 2009; Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, & 
Shackelford, 2015). 
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conflicts in the form of moral hazard (Jensen, 1986; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1994; Hope & Thomas, 2008), and adverse selection (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Baker, Stein, & 
Wurgler, 2003). As a result of these conflicts, managers invest sub-optimally, which reduces 
investment efficiency. Consistent with this, Jensen (1986) shows that self-interested managers 
maximize their personal welfare through empire building and growing the firm beyond its optimal 
size; managers reap personal benefits by investing in negative NPV projects that reduce 
shareholder value.6 
Several studies provide evidence for firm-level characteristics that moderate the detrimental 
effect of agency conflicts on investment efficiency. Biddle & Hilary (2006) and Biddle, Hilary, & 
Verdi (2009), for instance, show that higher financial reporting quality reduces information 
asymmetries between shareholders and managers and thus results in higher investment efficiency. 
This result is consistent with McNichols & Stubben (2008), who report a negative effect of 
earnings management on investment efficiency. Similarly, Cheng, Dhaliwal, & Zhang (2013) 
examine the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and find that 
investment efficiency increased in response to this disclosure. 
In concurrent work, De Simone, Klassen, & Seidman (2017) examine the effect of tax-
motivated income shifting on investment decisions and find that firm-level overinvestment is 
increasing in the aggressiveness of the income shifting of the firm. While De Simone et al. (2017) 
use similar subsidiary-level data in the construction of their proxy for shifting aggressiveness, our 
study is distinct from theirs. We are studying the effect of repatriation taxes and they are studying 
the effect of income shifting, and the two predicted effects on investment efficiency are distinct. 
                                               
6 Aside from empire building, managers might derive personal benefits from managerial optimism (Heaton, 2002), 
the desire to enjoy a quiet life (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003), and career concerns (Baker, 2000). 
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Our hypotheses do not depend on how the income came to be reported in a specific subsidiary, 
whether by being “true” income earned there or by income being shifted in or out, but depend only 
on the reported income being subject to repatriation taxes. Said another way, in the absence of any 
profit shifting (or, conversely, in a world in which all profits are shifted to minimize immediate 
tax burdens), our hypotheses would remain the same.  
Agency conflicts also exist between the parent of an MNC and the managers of its foreign 
subsidiaries due to cross-border frictions and moral hazard (Desai, Foley, & Hines 2007). These 
conflicts exacerbate resource allocation within MNCs (Stein, 1997) and potentially affect 
investment behavior. Consistent with this, Mian (2006) shows that local branches of multinational 
banks forego profitable lending opportunities to small businesses because they are unable to 
adequately communicate the value of such loans to their parent banks. Shroff et al. (2014) examine 
the external information environment in which foreign subsidiaries operate and find higher 
investment efficiency for subsidiaries in more transparent country-industries. This result suggests 
that external information enables a parent to more closely monitor the investment behavior of its 
foreign subsidiaries by assessing foreign subsidiaries relative to their local competitors. 
In summary, the two relevant streams in the extant literature show that repatriation taxes can 
negatively affect several firm-level outcomes, and that agency conflicts can impair investment 
efficiency. We bring these two streams together in developing our hypothesis in the next section. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Repatriation Taxes and Investment Efficiency 
All else equal, repatriation taxes encourage an MNC to retain income in its foreign subsidiary 
rather than paying a dividend to the parent. This strategy reduces the present value of repatriation 
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tax payments, for instance, by exploiting variation in tax rates over time due to tax holidays or tax 
reform. Moreover, the non-tax costs of deferring the repatriation of foreign income are low for 
subsidiaries because parents, unlike investors, do not expect steady dividend streams within MNCs 
(Lintner, 1956; Kopits, 1972). This flexibility in determining the extent of foreign income to 
repatriate leads to a positive relation between repatriation taxes and foreign cash holdings (Foley 
et al., 2007). 
The choice to leave cash abroad, however, could create agency conflicts between the parent’s 
central management and its subsidiary. In contrast to external financing, internally generated cash 
is not subject to effective monitoring and disciplining by external capital providers (Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986). Subsidiary managers can invest the available cash in projects that create 
personal benefits while being of low value to shareholders (Harford, 1999). Blanchard, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer (1994) provide empirical evidence that this occurs. Their findings suggest that 
managers who receive a cash windfall maximize their personal welfare by selecting economically 
suboptimal investment projects rather than returning excess cash to shareholders. 
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that repatriation taxes exacerbate these agency 
conflicts and impair the investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries. As oversight costs increase 
and the degree of monitoring decreases, the effect will be stronger (Shroff et al., 2014; Harford et 
al., 2017). In the absence of sufficient monitoring, the manager of a subsidiary could reap personal 
benefits by investing the cash retained in the subsidiary to avoid repatriation taxes in projects that 
are not aligned with the subsidiary's growth opportunities. MNCs located in territorial tax systems, 
in contrast, do not incur repatriation taxes when bringing foreign income back to the parent. As a 
result, managers of these subsidiaries have fewer opportunities to consume personal benefits and 
the investment behavior is expected to be more in line with local growth opportunities. Given these 
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differences, we expect subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes to invest less efficiently than 
subsidiaries that do not face this tax. This leads to our baseline hypothesis, stated in the alternative: 
H1: Subsidiary-level investment efficiency is decreasing in repatriation taxes. 
Since we argue that agency conflicts drive the negative effect of repatriation taxes on 
investment efficiency, one precondition for the hypothesized relation to hold is that the parent is 
unable to fully observe the investment behavior of its foreign subsidiary. However, prior research 
suggests that several mechanisms might resolve this friction. Shroff et al. (2014), for instance, 
show that external information facilitates the monitoring of foreign subsidiaries and Bloom, Sadun, 
& Van Reenen (2012) find that improved information technology systems reduce information 
asymmetries within MNCs. If these or similar mechanisms effectively alleviate information 
asymmetries between the parent and its foreign subsidiaries, we would not expect to find an effect 
of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency.7 
An alternative explanation for the effect hypothesized under H1 is that this investment 
behavior could still be economically optimal for MNCs and thus not driven by agency conflicts. 
For instance, investing foreign cash in the subsidiary could lead to a higher after-tax return 
compared to repatriating cash to the parent and paying the repatriation tax (Arena & Kutner, 2015; 
Hanlon et al., 2015). In line with this argument, Edwards et al., (2016) show that MNCs subject to 
high repatriation taxes engage in less profitable acquisitions abroad. Even though this strategy 
might minimize the tax burden of an MNC, it could lead to foreign investment that is less aligned 
                                               
7 Aside from these means to reduce the extent of asymmetric information within MNCs, specific tax rules might also 
alleviate agency conflicts associated with repatriation taxes. The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 
2005 (TIPRA), for instance, enables U.S. MNCs to relocate cash holdings to foreign subsidiaries that are less strongly 
prone to agency conflicts without triggering repatriation taxes (Murphy, 2017). Since our data covers financial years 
as of 2006 (see section 4), we are unable to test whether this reform had a mitigating effect on the efficiency of 
subsidiary-level investment in our setting.  
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with a subsidiary's growth opportunities. Consequently, if this effect dominates the investment 
implications of the outlined agency conflicts, we would not find support for our hypothesis. Based 
on these arguments, we contend that it is an empirical question whether repatriation taxes impair 
investment efficiency through the channel of agency conflicts. 
3.2 Cross-Sectional Hypotheses 
To supplement our baseline hypothesis, we formulate two cross-sectional predictions that 
examine variation in the effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency and that provide 
evidence for the driver of the effect. First, we expect a weaker effect of repatriation taxes on 
investment efficiency for subsidiaries that are less susceptible to agency conflicts associated with 
foreign cash holdings (Jensen, 1986). Agency conflicts depend on the oversight costs of 
monitoring the foreign subsidiary (e.g., Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001) and the extent of information 
transfers within the MNC. A parent that is closely involved in the investment decisions of its 
foreign subsidiary, for example by retaining decision rights or by obtaining more accurate 
information about potential investment projects (Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li, 2004), is 
better able to monitor the investment behavior of the foreign subsidiary, which reduces the extent 
of agency conflicts. 
The above arguments suggest that the manager of the subsidiary is less likely to invest cash 
sub-optimally and to consume private benefits when the parent monitors the investment behavior 
of its foreign subsidiary more closely. Therefore, we expect that stronger monitoring by the parent 
facilitates investment efficiency by reducing agency conflicts associated with repatriation taxes. 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Stronger monitoring by the parent mitigates the negative effect of repatriation taxes on 
investment efficiency. 
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Our second cross-sectional hypothesis examines the benefit of deferring repatriations. For 
instance, financially constrained MNCs exhibit high costs of external financing, which reduces the 
benefit of holding cash abroad (Whited & Wu, 2006; Edwards, Schwab, & Shevlin, 2015). For 
these MNCs, repatriation taxes are lower than the costs of raising external capital in order to fund 
investment or payouts (Altshuler & Grubert, 2003; Nessa, 2016; Beyer et al., 2017). Thus, 
financially constrained MNCs are less flexible in timing repatriations and more regularly return 
foreign income to the parent. In line with this argument, Albring, Mills, & Newberry (2011) show 
that during the 2004 U.S. tax holiday, financially unconstrained firms repatriated more foreign 
income than financially constrained MNCs. Similarly, Dyreng & Markle (2016) document that 
financial constraints mitigate outbound income shifting due to lower benefits of (temporarily) 
avoiding repatriation taxes. 
Since financial constraints discourage MNCs to hold cash abroad, we expect agency 
conflicts that stem from repatriation taxes to be less severe for these firms. Lower cash holdings 
limit the opportunities of subsidiary managers to consume personal benefits. Consequently, we 
expect financial constraints to mitigate the negative effect of repatriation taxes on investment 
efficiency. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: The negative effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency is reduced when the 
parent is financially constrained. 
4. Empirical Design and Data 
4.1 Empirical Design 
To test our hypothesis that repatriation taxes reduce the investment efficiency of foreign 
subsidiaries, we draw on Shroff et al., (2014) and estimate the following subsidiary-level OLS 
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regression:8 
!"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,.,* + 0123-,.,* + 045$67&879-,* + 	0;5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,* +∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (1) 
!"#$%&'$"&(,*	is the subsidiary’s yearly capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets.9 23-,.,*	is the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio and captures local growth opportunities of the foreign 
subsidiary in year t. We measure the PE-ratio per country-industry-year in which we observe a 
subsidiary’s investment. 5$67&879-,* is an indicator variable with the value of 1 if the parent of 
the foreign subsidiary is located in a worldwide tax system and 0 for subsidiaries of parents resident 
in a country with a territorial tax system.10 Alternatively, we calculate a continuous measure for 
the magnitude of repatriation taxes, which is the difference in the statutory tax rates of the country 
in which the parent is located and the country of the subsidiary.11  
Our empirical model is based on a regression of investment on growth opportunities (e.g. 
Badertscher, Shroff, & White, 2013; Shroff et al., 2014), in which 	01 captures the sensitivity of 
                                               
8 We provide variable definitions in Appendix A. 
9 !"#$%&'$"&(,*  measures the net change in fixed assets from year t-1 to t and thus resembles capital expenditures net 
of annual depreciation charges (i.e. net investment in fixed assets). In our sensitivity tests, we adjust this proxy for 
annual depreciation charges, yielding a measure for gross investment in fixed assets. In Table 9, our results are 
qualitatively similar. Thus, we consider the net change in fixed assets to be an adequate proxy in particular because 
depreciation data is not available in Orbis the full sample and we would loose a significant share of observations. In 
contrast to Shroff et al, (2014), we do not use annual changes in total assets as our dependent variable for two reasons. 
First, repatriation taxes result in higher cash holdings and might therefore mechanically lower the association between 
total assets and local growth opportunities. Second, in line with prior research on investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle 
& Hilary, 2006 and Biddle, et al., 2009), we are interested in real investment of a foreign subsidiary, which is more 
adequately measured with net changes in fixed assets.  
10 We collect information on tax systems and corporate tax rates from EY Corporate Tax Guides. We follow prior 
research (e.g., Markle (2016)) and classify the tax system in which a parentis resident as territorial or worldwide. 
11 In case of a negative difference, we set 5$67&879-,*  to zero since the foreign tax credit will (over)compensate any 
domestic taxes. 5$67&879-,* is also set to zero if the parent is resident in a territorial tax system. 
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subsidiary investment to local growth opportunities (i.e. investment efficiency). Consistent with 
efficient investment responding to growth opportunities, we expect a positive coefficient on 	01.12 
To draw conclusions about the effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency, we extend this 
model in two important ways. First, we add 5$67&879-,* to account for repatriation taxes and 
interact the variable with growth opportunities (23-,.,*). Second, we include fixed effects for each 
subsidiary-country-industry-year (αF,G,H; Bethmann, Jacob, & Müller, 2017) to compare investment 
efficiency of foreign subsidiaries in the same country-industry-year (see Figure 1).13 As we 
measure growth opportunities also per country-industry-year, the coefficient on 01 is absorbed in 
the main regression model. 
04 captures the effect of repatriation taxes on the level of investment, holding growth 
opportunities at zero. Managers might invest excess cash that results from repatriation taxes in 
empire building (Jensen, 1986) or enjoy a quiet life by selecting investment projects that do not 
maximize shareholder value (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). While empire building suggests a 
positive coefficient, quiet life would not predict any differences in the observed level of 
investment. Thus, we do not make a directional prediction for 04. Our coefficient of interest, 0;, 
is a measure of investment efficiency of a subsidiary subject to repatriation taxes relative to a 
counterfactual that does not bear these taxes. For the example outlined in Figure 1, 0; represents 
the investment efficiency of an Irish subsidiary owned by a U.S. MNC relative to an Irish 
subsidiary in the same industry-year and owned by an Austrian parent. A positive (negative) 
                                               
12 Since our fixed-effects structure absorbs the coefficient on 	01 in our main tests, we explicitly test and find a positive 
relation between investment and growth opportunities in our sample (see section 5.2). 
13 This approach enables us to identify the incremental effect of repatriation taxes on the investment-to-growth-
sensitivity while controlling for time-invariant and time-varying effects that equally affect investment of all 
subsidiaries in a given country-industry-year. As a result, we are able to rule out that economic shocks in given 
country-industry-year or differences across industries and countries drive the observed investment efficiency.  
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coefficient on 0; indicates higher (lower) investment efficiency. Based on H1, we expect a 
negative coefficient on 0;, which suggests that repatriation taxes lead to investment that is less 
strongly aligned with growth opportunities; i.e. investment is less efficient. 
Vector ?@"&A@B(,*>  includes subsidiary-level controls prior research has found to affect 
investment (e.g., Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard, 1996; Baker et al., 2003). To this end, we include 
the subsidiary’s return-on-assets (5@I*) to control for internally generated funds available for 
investment (Faulkender & Petersen, 2012). JKL$* is the natural logarithm of total assets and 
captures differences in investment opportunities (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002) as well as in the 
allocation of decision rights between the parent and the subsidiary (Robinson & Stocken, 2013). 
We include 87"MKNKBK&O*	to control for the stock of fixed assets (Biddle & Hilary, 2006).  
We also include parent-level controls for variables that might affect subsidiary-level 
investment and add 8@&7B	27A&KPK67&K@"* as the sum of direct and indirect participation of the 
parent in the subsidiary. MNCs choose their ownership in foreign subsidiaries to align incentives 
between the parent and the subsidiary and to facilitate monitoring (Antràs et al., 2009). We include 
the parent’s cash-flow-to-total-assets ratio (?7%ℎ	RB@S	27A$"&*) because MNCs use internal 
capital markets to fund investments of their foreign subsidiaries (Shin & Stulz, 1998; Arena & 
Kutner, 2015). 
In supplemental tests, we add the subsidiary’s cash ratio as a proxy for internally generated 
funds available for investment. One concern with adding this variable to the baseline model is that 
the cash ratio is a mediator control because subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes at the same 
time report higher cash holdings. Generally, to address bad control choices (Gow, Larcker, & 
Reiss, 2016; Swanquist & Whited, 2018), we run unreported regressions without control variables 
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and find similar results. 
4.2 Measuring Local Growth Opportunities 
To measure local growth opportunities, we follow Shroff et al. (2014) and Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundblad, & Siegel (2007). We collect Datastream’s equity indices and construct aggregated PE-
ratios per country-industry-year in which we observe subsidiary investment. Datastream provides 
several monthly equity indices along the taxonomy of the Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB).14 We use equity indices based on the 1-digit ICB level as this classification segregates 
subsidiaries into broad industrial categories and covers most countries available in Datastream.15 
We take the median of the monthly PE-ratios to obtain a yearly measure. Thus, for every country-
industry-year, 23-,.,*  is the ratio of aggregated shares prices of publicly listed firms divided by 
their aggregated earnings. We match PE-ratios with the remaining data via NACE industry codes.16  
23-,.,*	is an intuitive measure for growth opportunities as it builds on the rationale that 
financial markets price expected growth. A higher ratio of share prices to earnings for the firms in 
an industry suggests that investors expect stronger industry-level growth. Bekaert et al., (2007) 
examine this argument and show that country-specific PE-ratios are valid predictors for the growth 
opportunities on the country level. Another benefit of using country-industry-year-level PE-ratios 
results from them being exogenous to each individual subsidiary in our sample. Since PE-ratios 
                                               
14 ICB is an industry classification taxonomy launched by Dow Jones. The classification includes 10 industries (1-
digit-level), 19 supersectors (2-digit-level), 41 sectors (3-digit-level), and 114 subsectors (4-digit-level). For further 
information, refer to http://www.ftserussell.com/financial-data/industry-classification-benchmark-icb.  
15 Less aggregated ICB levels (e.g., 3-digit-level or 4-digit-level) would not allow a meaningful analysis due to a low 
number of subsidiary-year observations in the respective country-industry-year as well as a low number of firms to 
construct meaningful PE-ratios. This significantly reduces the number of countries with data available on PE-ratios. 
16 We match PE-ratios per ICB industry with Orbis data based on a matching table gratefully provided by Gwen Yu. 
This table converts to NAICS industry codes and we add NACE industry classifications, which are the most common 
and available industry codes in Orbis. Unfortunately, Orbis does not provide ICB codes directly.  
21 
 
require data of publicly listed firms in a country-industry-year, the private (unlisted) subsidiaries 
in our sample do not enter the calculation of the PE-ratios. 
4.3 Subsidiary Data and Sample 
We supplement these data with subsidiary-level unconsolidated financial statement data and 
parent-level consolidated financial statement data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. Our 
dataset covers the years 2006 to 2014. As several variables, such as !"#$%&'$"&(,*, reflect annual 
changes, our final sample covers the years 2007-2014. We re-construct an MNC’s holding 
structure and identify directly- and indirectly-held subsidiaries using the identifier of the parent 
and the shareholding percentage of the direct owner. Indirect shareholdings in our sample include 
subsidiaries located in up to five countries (i.e., with intermediate subsidiaries in four different 
countries). 
We drop subsidiaries with no or limited financial statement data, subsidiaries that file 
consolidated financial statements (Orbis code “C1” or “C2”), and subsidiaries with missing NACE 
industry classification, which is necessary to match the PE-ratios. Moreover, we drop domestic 
subsidiaries resident in the same country as the parent. By limiting our analysis to foreign 
subsidiaries, we examine subsidiaries that are equally susceptible to agency conflicts (e.g., due to 
oversight costs or cross-border frictions) but differ with respect to repatriation taxes.17 This 
procedure results in 567,600 subsidiary-year observations. 
                                               
17 Comparing domestic with foreign subsidiaries would lead to two groups that differ in the extent of agency conflicts 
as the absence of cross-border frictions results in stronger monitoring of domestic subsidiaries (NACE Code 7010; 
see Shroff, Verdi, & Yu, 2014). Furthermore, benchmarking the investment behavior of foreign subsidiaries against 
their domestic counterparts would significantly reduce our sample size and we would lose about 77.4 percent of the 
subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes. This is due to unconsolidated financial statement being unavailable for 
domestic U.S. subsidiaries.  
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We require a parent to hold a total participation of at least 50 percent in a subsidiary so that 
the parent has control over a foreign subsidiary and its decisions (e.g., whether or not to distribute 
a dividend).18 We follow the standard procedure of excluding subsidiaries in the financial (NACE 
code 6400 to 6899) and utility sector (NACE code 3500 to 3999) due to unique investment patterns 
in these industries (e.g. Badertscher et al., 2013). The same applies to financial holdings (NACE 
Code 7010) which mainly invest in financial assets and do not report capital expenditures (Shroff 
et al., 2014). We eliminate observations with missing or negative values for total assets, operating 
revenue, fixed assets, or cash and cash equivalents. Lastly, we require total assets, operating 
revenue, and fixed assets of at least US$10,000 to prevent denominator effects from biasing our 
results. We obtain a final sample of 48,470 subsidiary-years. The sample size varies slightly across 
specifications because not all variables are available for all tests.  
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. In Panel A, we present information for the full sample. 
The average annual investment in fixed assets of the subsidiaries in our sample amounts to 0.45 
percent of total assets.19 The average PE-ratio is 17.8, which is in line with the values reported in 
Shroff et al. (2014). On average, subsidiaries report a return-on-assets of 5.3 percent, total assets 
of US$64 million, and hold 23.6 percent of their total assets in fixed assets. With respect to parent-
level controls, we find that the average cash-flow-to-assets ratio is 8.5 percent and parents hold an 
average total participation of 95.1 percent in their foreign subsidiaries.  
                                               
18 Our results are qualitatively similar when using lower thresholds for a parent’s total participation (e.g., 25 percent).  
19 While this figure appears to be low, please recall that we scale the change in fixed assets by lagged total assets. 
When scaling the change in fixed assets by lagged fixed assets rather than total assets, we obtain an average annual 
growth in fixed assets of 14.8 percent. 
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In Panels B and C, we present descriptive statistics for two subsamples based on whether the 
subsidiary is subject to repatriation taxes. We do not find differences in means between for our 
dependent variable, !"#$%&'$"&(,*, and the average participation held by the parent 
(8@&7B	27A&KPK67&K@"*). For the remaining variables, means are significantly different between 
subsamples (all p < 0.05), which indicates the need for controls in our multivariate analysis.20  
26.2 percent of our subsidiary-year observations are subject to repatriation taxes and the 
average repatriation tax in this subsample amounts to 7.95 percent (Panel C). Thus, repatriation 
taxes are a relevant tax cost for a sizable proportion of the MNCs in our sample. In Panel D, we 
present information on the group structure of MNCs. The observations in our sample result from 
10,629 unique subsidiaries that are owned by 2,714 unique parents. Thus, the parents in our sample 
hold, on average, 3.9 subsidiaries, which is equal to 17.9 subsidiary-years per parent.  
In Panels A and B of Table 2, we display the countries in which the parents that own the 
subsidiaries in our sample are located. Parents that are not subject to repatriation taxes are mainly 
resident in large, developed countries, such as Japan, Germany, France, and the U.K. (Panel A). 
The majority of parents subject to repatriation taxes are resident in the U.S., being the only G20 
country that levied repatriation taxes throughout our entire sample period (Panel B).21 In Panel C, 
we present information on the countries in which the foreign subsidiaries are located. Subsidiaries 
in our sample mainly reside in Western European countries while a sizable proportion of 
observations stems from countries in Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland, Czech Republic) and Asia (e.g., 
                                               
20 Moreover, the differences are significant based on t-tests for the overall sample. The country-industry-year fixed 
effects should absorb a large portion of the differences. 
21 The U.K. and Japan both repealed repatriation taxes in 2009. Thus, for the first two years of our sample, we still 
have observations for foreign subsidiaries of U.K. and Japanese parents subject to repatriation taxes. We exploit these 
2009 tax reforms as natural experiments in our supplemental tests (see Section 6).  
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South Korea, China). The proportion of subsidiary-years subject to repatriation taxes ranges from 
43.4 percent in the U.K. to 13.6 percent in Slovenia.22  
5. Results 
5.1 Repatriation Taxes and Cash Holdings 
Since our hypotheses assume that repatriation taxes are associated with higher cash holdings 
abroad, we start our analysis by testing the correlation between repatriation taxes and cash-
holdings of the subsidiaries in our sample. Figure 2 plots the mean of the subsidiary cash ratio (i.e., 
cash-to-total-assets in year t) conditional on whether the subsidiary faces repatriation taxes. In line 
with evidence that repatriation taxes lead to higher aggregate cash holdings (Foley et al., 2007), 
these taxes are positively associated with the amount of cash held in foreign subsidiaries. The 
difference in cash holdings between the two groups ranges from 1.5 to 4 percentage points of total 
assets and is statistically significant in all sample years (untabulated; all p < 0.01). 
We supplement the graphical evidence in Figure 2 by estimating the following subsidiary-
level OLS regression: 
?7%ℎ57&K@(,* = ,-,. + ,* + 015$67&879-,* + ∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (2) 
We present regression results in Table 3. In Columns 1 and 2, we use an indicator variable 
for 5$67&879-,*	 while applying the continuous measure in Columns 3 and 4. Furthermore, we 
separately include country-industry and year fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3; the specification in 
                                               
22 Because our analyses are at the subsidiary-year level and include country-industry-year fixed effects, the range in 
proportions across countries is not problematic. The difference in the share of observations subject to repatriation 
taxes results from the pattern of cross-border shareholdings observed in the data. For instance, while parents from the 
U.S. hold a sizeable proportion of foreign subsidiaries located in the U.K., subsidiaries in Slovenia are predominantly 
owned by parents resident in European countries not levying any repatriation taxes.  
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Columns 2 and 4 includes country-industry-year fixed effects. Across all specifications, we find a 
positive and significant coefficient on 5$67&879-,*. The coefficient is also economically 
significant indicating that subsidiaries with repatriation taxes (i.e., the dummy 5$67&879-,* = 1) 
have a cash ratio that is1.22 percentage points higher than that of their peers not subject to 
repatriation taxes.23  Corroborating the graphical evidence above, these results suggest that 
repatriation taxes are positively associated with the amount of cash held by the subsidiaries in our 
sample.  
5.2 Growth Opportunities and Investment 
Next, we test whether subsidiary investment is associated with country-industry-year PE-
ratios as our measure for local growth opportunities. If PE-ratios capture local growth 
opportunities (Baker et al., 2003; Shroff et al., 2014), we expect investment to increase in PE-
ratios. To determine if this is the case, we estimate the following subsidiary-level OLS regression: 
!"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,. + ,* + 0123-,.,* + ∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (3) 
Note that, in contrast to our main specification, we separately include country-industry and 
year fixed effects to obtain a coefficient on 23. Table 4, Column 1 displays regression results. As 
expected, the coefficient on 23-,.,* is positive and significant. In economics terms, a coefficient of 
0.025 indicates that a one unit increase in the PE-ratio is associated with an increase in investment 
of 5.5 percent (relative to the mean of investment).24 We conclude that the PE-ratio of the 
respective country-industry-year represents a valid proxy for local growth opportunities. In 
                                               
23 Relative to the mean value of subsidiary-level cash ratio of 13.92 (see Table 1) this equals 8.8% (=1.222/13.92). 
24 We calculate this effect based on a one unit change in the PE-ratio and the mean value of investment, which is 0.453 
(see Table 1): 1 * 0.025/0.453=5.5%. 
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Columns 2 and 3, we split the sample based on whether the subsidiary faces repatriation taxes. The 
coefficient on 23-,.,* is positive and significant in the absence of repatriation taxes (Column 2) 
and zero and insignificant for the subsample of subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes (Column 
3). These results provide initial support for our hypothesis: the investment behavior of subsidiaries 
that face repatriation taxes seems be less in line with local growth opportunities. 
5.3 Baseline Results 
To test Hypothesis H1, we estimate Equation (1) and present results in Table 5. 
Corroborating our initial results, we find a negative and significant coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗23-,.,*. This result holds in Column 1 for the binary measure and in Column 2 for the continuous 
measure of 5$67&879-,*. These results suggest that investment of subsidiaries that face 
repatriation taxes is less in line with local growth opportunities, consistent with H1. The economic 
interpretation of this estimation is not straight-forward because the baseline coefficient on 23-,.,* 
(01) is omitted because it is absorbed by the fixed effects.25 We can, however, compare the 
magnitude to the estimation of the unconditional coefficient on 23-,.,* (i.e. without conditioning 
on  5$67&879-,*). Then, the coefficient estimate on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 of −0.031 (Column 1 
in Table 5) suggests that the presence of repatriation taxes basically eliminates the sensitivity of a 
subsidiary’s investment to local growth opportunities (see the coefficients of 0.025 and 0.032 in 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). Therefore, we consider this effect to be economically significant. 
                                               
25 In this specification, the variable 23 is omitted because it is measured on the country-industry-level and thus 
collinear to the country-industry-year fixed effects. Adding country-industry-year fixed effects provides superior 
identification since we compare subsidiaries that operate in the same country, industry, and year. Moreover, the other 
control variables are similar to those in the specification in which we use country-industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects (see Table 4), suggesting that the country-industry-year fixed effects do not over-specify our model. Therefore, 
we also use country-industry-year fixed effects in the subsequent cross-sectional tests. 
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The main coefficient on 5$67&879-,*	is marginally insignificant for the binary measure 
(p = 0.15) but positive and significant for the continuous measure in Column 2. Thus, conditional 
on growth opportunities being zero, subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes tend to investment 
more than subsidiaries in the same country-industry-year that do not face these taxes. As 
previously discussed, we are agnostic about the sign and statistical significance of coefficient on 5$67&879-,*	because there are two potential theories (“quiet life” and “empire building”). We 
interpret the positive coefficient as an indicator that empire building might prevail. Because 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 can be interpreted as an indicator of how efficiently subsidiaries invest, 
these results indicate that repatriation taxes lead to more investment abroad, but that the investment 
is less strongly aligned with local growth opportunities. Overall, we interpret this finding as 
evidence for repatriation taxes resulting in inefficient overinvestment.  
5.4 Cross-Sectional Tests 
5.4.1 Stronger monitoring of the subsidiary 
To test Hypothesis 2, we use several settings in which we expect differences in the 
monitoring of foreign subsidiaries to moderate the effect of repatriation taxes on investment 
efficiency. We present results in Table 6. First, Grinblatt & Keloharju (2001) suggest that parents 
operating in the same industry as the subsidiary face lower oversight costs and thus engage in more 
effective monitoring. In Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, we split the sample based on whether the 
parent and the subsidiary exhibit the same 1-digit NACE code. In line with our expectation, the 
coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 is insignificant for subsidiaries that operate in the same 
industry as their parents. Consistent with less efficient monitoring, the coefficient remains negative 
and significant for subsidiaries that operate in a different industry as their parents.  
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Second, Ang, Cole, & Lin (2000) indicate that monitoring decreases with the presence of 
minority shareholders. As the extent of minority ownership in the subsidiary increases, the parent 
faces lower incentives to monitor as minority shareholders free ride on its monitoring effort. To 
assess this prediction, we split our sample based on whether a subsidiary is partially owned by 
minority shareholders. As expected, the coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 is insignificant for 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (Column 1, Panel B). The coefficient, however, remains negative and 
significant for subsidiaries that are additionally owned by a minority shareholder (Column 2, Panel 
B).  
Third, Asiedu & Esfahani (2001) argue that the quality of institutions and corporate 
governance mechanisms of the subsidiary country shape the parent’s oversight costs. Thus, if the 
subsidiary is located in a country with weak corporate governance mechanisms, the parent faces 
high oversight costs, which leads to lower monitoring. We use the World Bank’s Corporate 
Governance Indicator as a country-level measure for the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms and split the sample at the median of the score.26 Consistent with our expectation, we 
find that the coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 is insignificant for subsidiaries located in 
countries with high quality corporate governance mechanisms (Column 1, Panel C). In contrast, 
the coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	is negative and significant if the corporate governance 
mechanisms of the subsidiary country are of low quality (Column 2, Panel C). 
Collectively, these results suggest that stronger monitoring by the parent mitigates the 
                                               
26 This measure runs from -2.5 for bad corporate governance to 2.5 for good corporate governance. We lose some 
observations as the measure is not available for all countries of our sample. Low corporate governance countries are: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, and 
Turkey. High corporate governance countries are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the U.K. We cross-check our results with a similar 
measure compiled by Transparency International and find that the results do not change.  
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negative effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency. These tests support Hypothesis 2 
and provide evidence that repatriation taxes impair investment efficiency through the channel of 
agency conflicts between the parent and its subsidiary. 
5.4.2 Financial constraints at the parent level 
To test Hypothesis 3, we split the sample based on whether the parent is financially 
constrained. The underlying argument is that a financially constrained parent is more likely to 
repatriate foreign income as it has to rely on internal funds in order to finance its domestic 
operations (see, for example, Desai et al., 2007). Because this results in lower cash holdings 
abroad, agency conflicts between a parent and its subsidiary tend to be less severe in this case. 
Therefore, we expect a weaker effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency.  
We use the parent’s cash-flow-to-total-assets ratio as a proxy for financial constraints. To 
this end, we sort parents within a country-industry into terciles of the cash-flow-to-total-assets 
ratio. We then classify parent-years for which a parent is in the lowest tercile as financially 
constrained. This approach is appropriate in our setting as parents that are low in cash compared 
to their country-industry peers have to predominantly rely on internal funds and thus are more 
likely to repatriate income from their foreign subsidiaries.27  
We present results in Table 7. In line with our prediction, we find a negative and significant 
coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 for the subsample of parents that we classified as financially 
constrained (Column 2). In Column 1, the coefficient on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 for financially 
                                               
27 Financial constraints are inherently hard to measure and no empirical proxy has been shown to consistently capture 
the underlying construct (Farre-Mensa & Ljungqvist, 2016). Using other common measures that are based on capital 
market data (e.g. bond rating) would shrink our sample size by about 80% as most of the parent firms in our sample 
are not listed. 
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unconstrained parents is insignificant. We conclude that the negative effect of repatriation taxes 
on investment efficiency is conditional on the parent’s financial constraints and varies with the 
benefits of deferring repatriation of foreign income.  
5.5 Additional Tests 
We conduct several additional tests to assess the sensitivity and the robustness of our 
baseline findings. We present results in Table 8Erreur ! Nous n’avons pas trouvé la source du 
renvoi.. First, we adjust our measure for subsidiary-level investment and add back annual 
depreciation on fixed assets. This expense affects the book value of fixed assets on the balance 
sheet and might therefore influence our primary investment measure. By adjusting !"#$%&'$"&(,*	 
for annual depreciation, we transform our measure from net investment in fixed assets into a 
measure of annual gross investments in fixed assets. Although lowering the sample size, we 
continue to find negative and significant coefficients on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*	 in Columns 1 and 
2. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients is similar to our baseline results (see Table 5). Thus, 
differences in depreciation on fixed assets across subsidiaries does not affect our baseline results. 
Second, we add the subsidiary’s cash ratio as an additional control variable to proxy for funds 
available for investment. As discussed, this variable might be a mediator control as subsidiaries 
that face repatriation taxes in our sample report higher cash holdings. Results in Columns 3 and 4, 
however, indicate that including this variable in the regression model does not affect our baseline 
results. 
Third, we drop subsidiaries subject to repatriation that are owned by non-U.S. MNCs. 
Results in Column 5 and 6 are similar to our baseline results. This test provides direct evidence 
that the negative effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency equally holds for subsidiaries 
of U.S. MNCs. Similarly, we test if our results hold when excluding foreign subsidiaries owned 
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by U.S. MNCs as these observations account for the majority of subsidiary-years subject to 
repatriation taxes. In Columns 7 and 8, we continue to find a negative and significant coefficient 
on 5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,*. Although they represent a major share of our sample, subsidiaries of 
U.S. MNCs do not drive our results.  
In untabulated tests, we change the definition of the 5$67&879-,* dummy to account for 
measurement error. In particular, we keep observations with repatriation taxes greater than 5%, 
10%, or 15%, respectively, while dropping observations with repatriation taxes below these 
thresholds. With these adjustments, we address the potential concern that small repatriation taxes 
might be immaterial for MNCs and that the parent might therefore operate as if it were under a 
territorial system. Results of these tests are very similar to our baseline findings, and thus support 
the validity of our 5$67&879-,* dummy as an identifier of MNCs subject to repatriation taxes.  
Taken together, these sensitivity tests indicate that our baseline results are robust to an 
alternative measure for subsidiary-level investment and to controlling for the subsidiary’s cash 
holdings. Furthermore, the effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency is not limited to 
the international tax system that was, until recently, in place in the U.S. but similarly extends to 
subsidiaries of MNCs located in worldwide-tax system countries other than the U.S.  
6. Tax Reforms in the U.K. and in Japan 
6.1 Institutional Setting and Research Design 
In 2009, both the U.K. and Japan reformed their international tax systems and switched from 
worldwide to territorial tax taxation. Because of this reform and starting in 2009, parents resident 
in the U.K. and in Japan are no longer subject to repatriation taxes on income earned in their 
foreign subsidiaries. We follow Arena and Kutner (2015) and exploit these tax reforms as a quasi-
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natural experiment to assert a causal interpretation of our baseline findings. In our setting, we 
expect the investment behavior of foreign subsidiaries owned by British or Japanese parents to be 
more strongly aligned with growth opportunities after repatriation taxes have been eliminated.  
To test this expectation, we apply a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) research design with 
subsidiaries of British and Japanese MNCs as the treatment group. We compare the investment 
behavior of these subsidiaries to a control group of foreign subsidiaries owned by U.S. MNCs. 
Subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs are an ideal control group because the U.S. levied repatriation taxes 
on foreign income throughout the entire sample period. We estimate the following DiD 
specification separately for subsidiaries of British and Japanese MNCs using OLS: 
!"#$%&'$"&(,* = , + 0123-,.,* + 04?@["&AO- + 0;2@%&* + 0\?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&* +0]?@["&AO- ∗ 23-,.,* + 0^2@%&* ∗ 23-,.,* + 0_?@["&AO- ∗2@%&* ∗ 23-,.,* + ∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (4) 
We add indicator variables for the treatment group (?@["&AO-) and for years after the tax 
reform (2@%&*). ?@["&AO- is equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a parent resident in the U.K. 
or Japan, respectively. 2@%&* is equal to 1 for years after the tax reform. As the reform became 
effective in both countries on January 1, 2009, 2@%&* is equal to 1 for years after 2008. The 
interaction term, ?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&* captures the level of investment in the post period of 
subsidiaries owned by U.K. or Japanese MNCs, respectively, relative to subsidiaries of U.S. 
MNCs. We expect a negative coefficient on ?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&*, which suggests that foreign 
subsidiaries of British or Japanese MNCs invest less after the reform (Arena & Kutner, 2015). Our 
main coefficient of interest is the treatment effect conditional on local growth opportunities. To 
this end, we interact ?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&* with 23-,.,* and expect a positive coefficient on the 
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interaction. Such a result indicates that after the reform investment of foreign subsidiaries owned 
by British or Japanese MNCs is more sensitive to growth opportunities relative to investment of 
foreign subsidiaries owned by U.S. parents; i.e. investment is more efficient after the reform.  
We follow our baseline model and include country-industry-year fixed effects. Thus, we 
compare treatment subsidiaries and control subsidiaries that invest in the same foreign country, 
industry, and year. This approach mitigates concerns that unobserved subsidiary country or 
industry variables affect our results. Nonetheless, the subsidiaries in a country-industry-year differ 
with respect to the country in which their parent is located because treated subsidiaries are owned 
by British or Japanese MNCs and the control subsidiaries by U.S. MNCs.  
6.2 Results 
In Table 9, we present results for the DiD estimation including subsidiaries of British 
(Columns 1 and 2) and Japanese MNCs (Columns 3 and 4), respectively. For both reforms, we 
find a positive and significant coefficient on ?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&* ∗ 23-,.,*, which suggests that the 
tax reform resulted in higher investment efficiency. This finding holds for specifications without 
fixed effects (Columns 1 and 3) and regressions that include country-industry-year fixed effects 
(Columns 2 and 4).28 The coefficient on ?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&* is negative and significant in three out 
of four specifications. This result is in line with Arena & Kutner (2015) and indicates that foreign 
subsidiaries of MNCs affected by the tax reform reduced their level of investment. Collectively, 
our results suggest that the repeal of repatriation taxes, while leading to lower investment, resulted 
in a significant increase in the investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries owned by British and 
Japanese parents relative to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs. More generally, we can infer that 
                                               
28 In unreported test we find qualitatively similar results when we extend the pre- and post-period to two years each. 
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the effect holds in both directions meaning that the negative effect of repatriation taxes on 
investment efficiency vanishes once repatriation taxes are abolished. Finally, the results from these 
quasi-natural experiments suggest that repatriation taxes have a causal effect on the investment 
efficiency of foreign subsidiaries. 
To validate our results from the DiD estimation, we conduct placebo tests in which we assign 
the tax reforms to random years other than 2009. Similarly, we run the same regressions on a 
sample of subsidiaries owned by MNCs located in countries without a similar tax reform, such as 
Germany or France, and compare their investment behavior to subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs. In all 
tests (untabulated), the coefficient on ?@["&AO- ∗ 2@%&* ∗ 23-,.,* is insignificant, indicating that 
we do not capture a random, non-tax reform effect in our estimation.  
7. Conclusion 
Using a global sample of MNCs and their foreign subsidiaries, we study whether repatriation 
taxes, through the incentive to keep cash abroad, lower the efficiency of subsidiary-level 
investment. We find that investment of foreign subsidiaries subject to repatriation taxes is less 
strongly aligned with local growth opportunities, i.e. it is less efficient. This negative effect of 
repatriation taxes is weaker for better-monitored subsidiaries, suggesting that agency conflicts 
between a parent’s central management and a subsidiary’s management drive this effect. Similarly, 
the effect is weaker for subsidiaries of financially constrained parents, which have a greater need 
for repatriating the earnings of their foreign subsidiaries. Conclusively, our results suggest that 
aside from incentivizing an MNC to hold cash abroad (Foley et al., 2007), repatriation taxes lead 
to agency conflicts within an MNC.  
We provide additional evidence for a likely causal interpretation of our findings by 
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examining international tax reforms in the U.K. and Japan that repealed repatriation taxes on 
earnings of foreign subsidiaries in 2009. Corroborating our baseline results, we find that the 
investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries increased after repatriation taxes were eliminated.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature 
on the economic consequences of repatriation taxes by explicitly linking repatriation taxes to the 
investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries. We document that agency conflicts within an MNC 
drive the negative effect of repatriation taxes on investment efficiency. Prior research (Hanlon et 
al., 2015; Harford et al., 2017) has documented that repatriation tax induced cash indirectly affects 
the profitability of headquarter M&A activities. In this paper, on the other hand, we provide 
evidence for a direct (i.e. subsidiary-level) effect of repatriation taxes that causes efficiency losses. 
Second, our findings extend the literature on internal capital markets (Beyer et al., 2017; 
Williamson, 1975) and suggest that repatriation taxes aggravate agency conflicts between the 
parent and its foreign subsidiary and drive heterogeneity in investment efficiency observed across 
foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, this finding underlines the importance of effective monitoring of 
excess cash held by a foreign subsidiary. Third, we provide needed empirical evidence on the 
expected economic consequences of the most recent U.S. tax reform (TCJA) that eliminates 
repatriation taxes on future foreign earnings. Our results suggest that this reform may lead to 
efficiency gains for U.S. MNCs and their shareholders. The subsidiary country, in contrast, may 
bear negative economic consequences in the form of lower investment.   
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definition 
  
Capital Intensity Fixed assets over total assets (subsidiary-year level).    
Cash Ratio Cash holdings over total assets (subsidiary-year level).    
Cash Flow Parent Cash flow over total assets (parent-year level).    
Investment Change in fixed assets before depreciation relative to prior year's 
total assets (subsidiary-year level).    
Gross Investment  
 
Change in fixed assets adjusted for annual depreciation relative to 
prior year's total assets (subsidiary-year level).   
PE Price-to-Earnings ratio (country-industry-year level). We calculate 
the annual value as the median of monthly values.   
RepatTax 
(indicator) 
Indicator variable for repatriation taxes based on the parent-
subsidiary country pair: 0 for subsidiary-years of parents resident 
in a territorial tax system or a worldwide tax system with a lower 
tax rate than the subsidiary country; 1 for subsidiary-years of 
parents resident in worldwide tax system with a higher tax rate 
than subsidiary country.   
RepatTax 
(continuous) 
Continuous measures for repatriation taxes based on the parent-
subsidiary country pair: Difference in statutory tax rate of the 
country in which the parent is resident and the subsidiary country. 
We set the measure to zero if the parent is resident in a territorial 
tax system and if the parent is resident in a worldwide tax system 
but the tax rate in this country is lower than the tax rate in the 
subsidiary country.   
RoA Profit or loss after taxes over total assets (subsidiary-year level). 
  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (subsidiary-year level).   
Total Participation Total direct and indirect participation of a parent in a subsidiary 
(subsidiary level). 
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Figure 1: Example for the empirical approach 
 
Note: This figure illustrates our empirical approach. Assume we have two Irish subsidiaries that operate in 
the same country, industry, and year. By including country-industry-year fixed affects, we limit our 
comparison to these two Irish subsidiaries. However, the subsidiaries differ with regard to their parent’s 
country, which affects repatriation taxes. The subsidiary with the Austrian parent (Sub 1) does not face 
repatriation taxes because Austria applies a territorial tax system. Sub 2 has a U.S. parent and therefore 
faces repatriation taxes of 22.5 percent (U.S. CIT credited with the Irish CIT) since the U.S. applies a 
worldwide tax system. 
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Figure 2: Subsidiary Cash Ratio over Time 
 
Note: This graph presents the mean subsidiary cash ratio for sample years 2007 to 2014. We split the sample 
based on whether a subsidiary is subject to repatriation taxes. Untabulated t-tests suggest that the difference 
is statistically significant in each sample year (all p < 0.01). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
 Panel A: All  
Investment (in %) 48,470 0.45 8.15 -2.36 -0.29 1.52 
PE Ratio 48,470 17.77 7.81 12.85 16.25 20.35 
Repat Tax Rate (in %) 48,470 2.05 4.46 0 0 1.01 
Repat Tax Dummy 48,470 0.261 0.439 0 0 1 
RoA (in %) 48,470 5.26 12.51 0.05 4.49 11.08 
Size 48,470 9.77 1.65 8.58 9.73 10.91 
Tangibility (in %) 48,470 23.62 22.82 4.58 15.69 37.65 
Total Participation (in %) 48,470 95.12 12.31 99.98 100 100 
Cash Ratio Subsidiary (in %) 48,470 13.92 17.21 1.48 7.05 20.01 
Cash Flow Parent (in %) 48,470 8.50 5.19 5.30 7.96 11.4 
 Panel B: No Repat Tax 
Investment (in %) 35,807 0.45 8.22 -2.42 -0.30 1.58 
PE Ratio 35,807 17.87 7.89 12.95 16.35 20.35 
Repat Tax Rate (in %) 35,807 0 0 0 0 0 
Repat Tax Dummy 35,807 0 0 0 0 0 
RoA (in %) 35,807 4.841 12.49 -0.19 4.174 10.61 
Size 35,807 9.70 1.66 8.50 9.66 10.85 
Tangibility (in %) 35,807 24.20 22.72 5.03 16.67 38.57 
Total Participation (in %) 35,807 95.1 12.16 99.95 100 100 
Cash Ratio Subsidiary (in %) 35,807 13.50 16.70 1.48 6.90 19.36 
Cash Flow Parent (in %) 35,807 8.18 5.00 5.15 7.65 11.11 
 Panel C: Repat Tax 
Investment (in %) 12,663 0.441 7.95 -2.18 -0.25 1.386 
PE Ratio 12,663 17.48* 7.56 12.7 16.05 19.95 
Repat Tax Rate (in %) 12,663 7.86 5.54 3.6 7 10.69 
Repat Tax Dummy 12,663 1 0 1 1 1 
RoA (in %) 12,663 6.42* 12.5 0.67 5.36 12.24 
Size 12,663 9.96* 1.61 8.82 9.93 11.07 
Tangibility (in %) 12,663 21.98* 23.04 3.54 12.59 34.91 
Total Participation (in %) 12,663 95.16 12.72 99.99 100 100 
Cash Ratio Subsidiary (in %) 12,663 15.12* 18.53 1.48 7.42 22.41 
Cash Flow Parent (in %) 12,663 9.42* 5.57 5.86 8.94 12.64 
 Panel D: Data on Corporate Structures 
# of Unique Subsidiaries 10,629      
# of Unique Ultimate Owners (UO) 2,714      
# of Subsidiary Years per UO  17.86 32.07 3 8 18 
# of Subsidiaries per UO   3.92 6.29 1 2 4 
 
Note: All observations are on the subsidiary level (unless indicated otherwise). * denotes statistically 
significant differences, at the 5% level (two-tailed) between the subsamples of subsidiaries not subject 
to/subject to repatriation taxes. 
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Table 2: Parent and Subsidiary Countries  
Panel A: No Repatriation Tax   
British Virgin 
Islands 13 0.0% 
Parent Country N %   Cyprus 13 0.0% 
Japan 7,536 15.5%  Macedonia 13 0.0% 
Germany 5,235 10.8%  Turkey 13 0.0% 
France 3,452 7.1%  Malta 10 0.0% 
Sweden 3,122 6.4%  Gibraltar 8 0.0% 
U.K. 2,735 5.6%  Serbia 8 0.0% 
Switzerland 2,630 5.4%  Barbados 6 0.0% 
Italy 1,304 2.7%  Russia 5 0.0% 
Netherlands 1,302 2.7%  Peru 4 0.0% 
Spain 1,119 2.3%  Liechtenstein 3 0.0% 
Finland 1,060 2.2%  Morocco 3 0.0% 
Luxembourg 739 1.5%  Qatar 3 0.0% 
Norway 727 1.5%  Chile 2 0.0% 
Ireland 674 1.4%  Brazil 1 0.0% 
Belgium 614 1.3%  Total 35,807 73.9% 
Canada 455 0.9%  Panel B: Repatriation Tax 
Taiwan 408 0.8%  Parent Country N %  
Austria 406 0.8%  U.S. 9,797 20.2% 
Denmark 386 0.8%  Japan 1,837 3.8% 
Korea 314 0.6%  India 384 0.8% 
Australia 209 0.4%  U.K. 296 0.6% 
U.S. 174 0.4%  Korea 114 0.2% 
South Africa 119 0.2%  China 52 0.1% 
Israel 110 0.2%  Taiwan 48 0.1% 
Poland 110 0.2%  Greece 43 0.1% 
Bermuda 99 0.2%  Israel 35 0.1% 
China 93 0.2%  Brazil 29 0.1% 
Singapore 86 0.2%  Croatia 21 0.0% 
Hungary 82 0.2%  Pakistan 4 0.0% 
Portugal 62 0.1%  Ireland 1 0.0% 
New Zealand 47 0.1%  New Zealand 1 0.0% 
Iceland 41 0.1%  Peru 1 0.0% 
India 40 0.1%  Total 12,663 26.1% 
Malaysia 39 0.1%     
Croatia 34 0.1%     
United Arab 
Emirates 34 0.1%  
   
Greece 28 0.1%     
Hong Kong 25 0.1%     
Slovenia 19 0.0%     
Thailand 17 0.0%     
Mauritius 16 0.0%         
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Panel C: Subsidiaries   Singapore 683 1.4% 31.9% 
Subsidiary 
Country N 
% of  
sample 
% with 
Rep. Tax 
 Austria 650 1.3% 18.3% 
 Australia 572 1.2% 25.7% 
U.K. 7,277 15.0% 43.4%  Greece 572 1.2% 19.8% 
France 6,411 13.2% 23.1%  Colombia 570 1.2% 42.3% 
Germany 4,464 9.2% 26.8%  Philippines 378 0.8% 25.1% 
Italy 3,637 7.5% 22.0%  Bulgaria 372 0.8% 20.4% 
Spain 3,548 7.3% 25.9%  Croatia 361 0.7% 13.9% 
Poland 2,878 5.9% 19.2%  Slovenia 361 0.7% 13.6% 
Belgium 2,559 5.3% 22.5%  Ireland 358 0.7% 45.8% 
Sweden 1,932 4.0% 25.8%  India 351 0.7% 18.5% 
Norway 1,346 2.8% 16.0%  Denmark 203 0.4% 15.3% 
Czech Republic 1,328 2.7% 17.5%  Turkey 146 0.3% 17.8% 
Korea 1,095 2.3% 23.7%  Luxembourg 27 0.1% 59.3% 
Finland 1,077 2.2% 20.7%  Taiwan 17 0.0% 23.5% 
Portugal 1,047 2.2% 19.3%  Malta 15 0.0% 0.0% 
Netherlands 903 1.9% 33.3%  Brazil 12 0.0% 25.0% 
China 900 1.9% 14.3%  Morocco 5 0.0% 20.0% 
Hungary 892 1.8% 25.3%  Cyprus 4 0.0% 0.0% 
Romania 834 1.7% 20.5%  Total 48,470 100%  
Russia 685 1.4% 15.0%           
Note: Panel A presents observations of parents resident in countries with a territorial tax system, i.e. they 
do not face repatriation taxes on income earned in foreign subsidiaries. Panel B presents observations of 
parents resident in countries with a worldwide tax system, i.e. they face repatriation taxes on income earned 
in foreign subsidiaries. The U.K. and Japan are present in both Panels because they switched from a 
worldwide to a territorial system in 2009. Panel C presents observations of foreign subsidiaries. We present 
information as a fraction of the total sample as well as on the share of observations subject to repatriation 
taxes. 
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Table 3: Subsidiary Cash Ratio and Repatriation Taxes 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
    Repat Tax 
Variables Prediction Dummy Continuous 
Repat Tax + 1.222** 1.252** 0.075** 0.082** 
    (0.472) (0.484) (0.034) (0.038) 
RoA  0.163*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Size  -1.985*** -1.985*** -1.976*** -1.976*** 
  (0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.125) 
Tangibility  -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.174*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Total Participation  0.021* 0.021* 0.020* 0.020* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Observations   48,456 48,298 48,456 48,298 
Adjusted R²   0.178 0.170 0.178 0.170 
Country-Industry FE  YES NO YES NO 
Year FE  YES NO YES NO 
Country-Industry-Year FE   NO YES NO YES 
 ?7%ℎ57&K@(,* = ,-,. + ,* + 015$67&879-,* + ∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (2) 
 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (2). The dependent variable is the 
subsidiary’s cash ratio. We report the results for an indicator variable (Columns 1 and 2) and the 
continuous measure (Columns 3 and 4) for 5$67&879-,*. Standard errors are clustered on the 
subsidiary country-industry level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 4: Investment and PE-Ratio 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
  Prediction Full  
sample 
No 
Repat Tax 
Repat 
Tax Variables (1) | (2) | (3) 
PE + | + | ? 0.025** 0.032** -0.000 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
RoA  0.056*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Size  0.123*** 0.118*** 0.138** 
  (0.037) (0.040) (0.067) 
Tangibility  0.041*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Total Participation  0.004 -0.004 0.023** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) 
Cash Flow Parent  0.017** 0.026*** -0.012 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Observations  48,456 35,796 12,648 
Adjusted R²  0.060 0.062 0.071 
Country-Industry FE  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES 
Country-Industry-Year FE   NO NO NO 
 !"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,.,* + 0123-,.,* + ∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (3) 
 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (3). The dependent 
variable is subsidiary investment. We split the sample based on whether the subsidiary 
is not (Column 2) or is (Column 3) subject to repatriation taxes. Standard errors are 
clustered on the subsidiary country-industry level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Baseline Results 
  
  (1) (2) 
  Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
    Repat Tax 
Variables Prediction Dummy Continuous 
Repat Tax  0.376 0.040* 
  (0.261) (0.022) 
Repat Tax*PE - -0.031** -0.003*** 
    (0.014) (0.001) 
RoA  0.052*** 0.052*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Size  0.098*** 0.097*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) 
Tangibility  0.040*** 0.040*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Total Participation  0.004 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Cash Flow Parent  0.019** 0.018** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations   48,298 48,298 
Adjusted R²   0.087 0.087 
Country-Industry FE  NO NO 
Year FE  NO NO 
Country-Industry-Year FE   YES YES 
 !"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,.,* + 0123-,.,* + 045$67&879-,* + 0;5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,* +∑0>?@"&A@B(,*> + C(,*  (1) 
 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (1). The 
dependent variable is subsidiary investment. We report the results for an 
indicator variable (Columns 1 and 2) and the continuous measure 
(Columns 3 and 4) for 5$67&879-,*. Standard errors are clustered on the 
subsidiary country-industry level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
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Table 6: Cross Sectional Results (Monitoring Split) 
  PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C 
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
  Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
  Prediction Industry Ownership Corporate Governance 
Variables (1) | (2) Same Different 100% <100% High Low 
Repat Tax  0.081 0.497 0.356 0.268 -0.117 1.129*** 
  (0.420) (0.408) (0.308) (0.483) (0.299) (0.361) 
Repat Tax*PE ? | - -0.007 -0.035* -0.020 -0.047* -0.000 -0.071*** 
    (0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.013) 
RoA  0.062*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Size  0.154*** 0.044 0.066 0.127** 0.055 0.166** 
  (0.055) (0.043) (0.042) (0.061) (0.044) (0.064) 
Tangibility  0.040*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.030*** 0.044*** 0.031*** 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Participation  0.009 -0.003   0.009 0.027* 
  (0.008) (0.004)   (0.009) (0.014) 
Cash Flow Parent  0.016 0.018** 0.012 0.041*** -0.006 0.016 
  (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.010) 
Observations   19,375 28,709 33,810 14,240 28,212 15,579 
Adjusted R²   0.111 0.073 0.084 0.111 0.073 0.096 
Country-Industry FE  NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE  NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country-Industry-Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 !"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,.,* + 0123-,.,* + 045$67&879-,* + 0:5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,* + ∑0=>?"&@?A(,*= + B(,*   (1) 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (1). The dependent variable is subsidiary investment. In Panel A, 
we split the sample based on whether the parent and the subsidiary operate in the same (Column 1) or different (Column 2) 
industry based on 1-digit NACE codes. In Panel B, we split the sample based on whether the subsidiary is wholly owned (Column 
1) or partially owned (Column 2). In Panel C, we split the sample into subsidiary countries with high quality corporate 
governance mechanisms (Column 1) and countries with low quality corporate governance mechanisms based on the World 
Bank’s Corporate Governance Indicator. We report the results for an indicator variable for 5$67&879-,*.Unreported test suggest 
similar results for the continuous measure for 5$67&879-,*. Standard errors are clustered on the subsidiary country-industry 
level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 7: Cross Sectional Results (Financial Constraints) 
  
  (1) (2) 
  Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
  Prediction Parent financially constrained 
Variables (1) | (2) Yes No 
Repat Tax  0.048 0.547* 
  (0.336) (0.324) 
Repat Tax*PE ? | - -0.008 -0.041** 
    (0.016) (0.017) 
RoA  0.048*** 0.055*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) 
Size  0.101** 0.098** 
  (0.050) (0.045) 
Tangibility  0.035*** 0.044*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
Total Participation  -0.004 0.007 
  (0.008) (0.005) 
Cash Flow Parent  0.010 0.025** 
  (0.022) (0.010) 
Observations  16,631 31,465 
Adjusted R²  0.078 0.095 
Country-Industry FE  NO NO 
Year FE  NO NO 
Country-Industry-Year FE   YES YES 
 !"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,.,* + 0123-,.,* + 045$67&879-,* + 0:5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,* +∑0=>?"&@?A(,*= + B(,*  (1) 
 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (1). The dependent 
variable is subsidiary investment. We split the sample based on whether parent is 
(Column 1) or is not (Column 2) financially constrained. We classify a parent-
year as financially constrained (unconstrained) with a cash-flow-to-total-assets-
ratio in the lowest (highest) tercile it a country-industry. We report the results for 
an indicator variable for 5$67&879-,*.Unreported test suggest similar results for 
the continuous measure for 5$67&879-,*. Standard errors are clustered on the 
subsidiary country-industry level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
    Dependent Variable: Gross Investment  
Subsidiary Cash-ratio 
as Control 
Worldwide Systems: 
U.S. parents only 
Worldwide Systems: 
U.S. parents excluded 
  Repat Tax Repat Tax Repat Tax Repat Tax 
Variables Prediction Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous Dummy Continuous 
Repat Tax  0.076 0.027 0.380 0.040* 0.322 0.043 0.607 0.029 
  (0.275) (0.026) (0.264) (0.022) (0.273) (0.030) (0.445) (0.032) 
Repat Tax*PE - -0.030** -0.003** -0.031** -0.003*** -0.027* -0.003* -0.050** -0.003*** 
    (0.015) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) 
RoA  0.050*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  -0.183*** -0.188*** 0.082** 0.080** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.040) 
Tangibility  0.124*** 0.124*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Total Participation  0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cash Flow Parent  0.083*** 0.080*** 0.019** 0.018** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Cash-ratio Subsidiary    -0.009*** -0.009***     
    (0.003) (0.003)     
Observations   43,099 43,099 46,975 46,975 43,370 43,370 38,339 38,339 
Adjusted R²   0.167 0.167 0.088 0.088 0.082 0.082 0.094 0.094 
Country-Industry FE  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country-Industry-Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES !"#$%&'$"&(,* = ,-,.,* + 0123-,.,* + 045$67&879-,* + 0:5$67&879-,* ∗ 23-,.,* + ∑0=>?"&@?A(,*= + B(,*   (1) 
 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (1). The dependent variable is subsidiary investment (Columns 3 to 8) and subsidiary 
investment adjusted for annual depreciation (Columns 1 and 2). We report the results for an indicator variable (Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and the continuous 
measure (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) for 5$67&879-,*. Column 3 and 4 include subsidiary-level cash ratios as additional control variable. We include U.S. 
parents only (exclude U.S. parents) and report the results in column 5 and 6 (column 7 and 8). Standard errors are clustered on the subsidiary country-
industry level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 9: Tax Reforms in the U.K. and Japan 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
  U.K. vs. U.S. 
2008-2009 
Japan vs. U.S. 
2008-2009 Variables Prediction 
Country*Post*PE + 0.324* 0.356* 0.234*** 0.304*** 
    (0.188) (0.208) (0.085) (0.109) 
Country*Post - -5.707* -4.887 -2.447* -3.468* 
  (3.145) (3.693) (1.371) (1.767) 
PE  + 0.062  0.057  
  (0.046)  (0.043)  
Country*PE  -0.235** -0.233** -0.159** -0.179** 
  (0.100) (0.112) (0.068) (0.073) 
Post*PE  -0.079  -0.075  
  (0.062)  (0.058)  
Country  4.508** 3.366 1.788 2.090 
  (2.047) (2.312) (1.178) (1.404) 
Post  3.218***  3.300***  
  (1.161)  (1.055)  
RoA  0.039 0.042 0.075*** 0.070*** 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.017) (0.018) 
Size  -0.345* -0.184 -0.056 0.009 
  (0.177) (0.197) (0.104) (0.117) 
Tangibility  0.115*** 0.116*** 0.070*** 0.077*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) 
Total Participation  0.044* 0.049 0.029** 0.032** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.013) (0.013) 
Cash Flow Parent  -0.038 -0.032 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations  3,579 3,533 5,035 4,984 
Adjusted R²  0.044 0.067 0.042 0.072 
Country-Industry FE  NO NO NO NO 
Year FE  NO NO NO NO 
Country-Industry-Year FE   NO YES NO YES 
 !"#$%&'$"&(,* = , + ./012,3,* + ∑.567"&879(,*5 + .:67;"&8<2 + +.=07%&* + .>67;"&8<2 ∗07%&* + .@67;"&8<2 ∗ 012,3,* + .A07%&* ∗ 012,3,* + .B67;"&8<2 ∗ 07%&* ∗ 012,3,* + C(,*  (4) 
 
Note: This table presents regression results based on Equation (4). The dependent variable 
is subsidiary investment. 67;"&8< indicates that the foreign subsidiary is owned by a U.K. 
or Japan MNC, respectively. 07%& indicates the period after the tax reform in the U.K. and 
Japan, i.e. after 2009. Standard errors are clustered on the subsidiary country-industry level 
and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
